In this paper, a novel safety-related variant of complete test suites for finite state machines is introduced. Under certain hypotheses which are similar to the ones used in the wellknown W-Method and its improved versions, the new method guarantees to uncover every violation of safety properties from a certain well-defined class, while erroneous behaviour without safety relevance may remain undetected. While the method can be based on any of the known complete strategies for FSM testing, its most effective variant is based on the H-method, and this variant is presented in detail, denoted as the Safety-complete H-Method. It is guaranteed that application of the Safety-complete H-Method always results in less or equally many test cases than when applying the original H-Method. In well-defined situations that can be pre-determined from the reference model, the Safety-complete H-Method leads to a substantial reduction of test cases in comparison to the size of the analogous H test suites. We advocate this new test suite for situations, where exhaustive testing of the complete system is too expensive. In these cases, strong guarantees with respect to fault coverage should only be given for the errors representing safety violations, while it may be considered as acceptable if less critical errors remain undetected.
Introduction

Motivation
researchers over the last 50 years, so that a large variety of contributions exists. On the other hand, the often infeasible size of the test suites involved has frequently prevented their practical application.
As a result, there is a considerable interest in testing strategies allowing to focus the effort on certain critical properties, while requiring lesser fault coverage for non-critical ones. These approaches can be regarded as a combination of conformance testing and propertybased testing: we are no longer interested in full conformance, but only require complete fault coverage for safety-properties.
Reduced test suites are of particular interest for regression testing after having changed certain functions of the system. In such a situation, it is required to test (1) the changed functions and (2) all safety (or business-critical) requirements, so as to ensure that the updates did not affect critical system behaviour.
Main contributions
In this article, a novel contribution to property-oriented testing for the domain of deterministic, completely specified, finite state machines is presented. Our approach is based on the H-Method (Dorofeeva et al. 2005 ) which-to our best knowledge-currently is the most effective complete test method for FSMs, because it usually requires fewer test cases than the W-Method (Vasilevskii 1973; Chow 1978) , Wp-Method (Luo et al. 1994) , or HSI-Method (Luo et al. 1995) , when applied to the same reference model.
We extend the H-Method in such a way, that complete coverage for output and transition faults (including addition of new states) is guaranteed, if these lead to erroneous outputs representing safety violations. To this end, an abstraction concept for outputs is introduced, so that it can be formally captured whether an erroneous replacement of another output for the expected one presents a safety violation or just a non-critical deviation. In contrast to other publications in this field, we formally prove that our strategy is complete with respect to this safety-related fault coverage. We show by means of examples, that applying this Safety-complete H-Method can lead to significantly reduced test suites in comparison to the H-Method, though this is not guaranteed, but depends on the nature of the reference model and its safety-related abstraction.
Main contributions and relation to previous work
The material presented here extends the publication (Huang and Peleska 2017a) in the following ways.
1. While Huang and Peleska (2017a) was based on the Wp-Method, the present article uses the more effective H-Method, which requires less test cases while still ensuring completeness. 2. A new algorithm for calculating test suites according to the safety-complete H-Method is presented. 3. The evaluation is now based on the safety-complete H-Method, and it has been extended by using random-generations of FSMs.
Overview
In Section 2, basic terms and concepts are introduced, so that this article remains sufficiently self-contained. In Section 3, the Safety-complete H-Method and its related definitions are introduced, and its completeness properties are proven. An algorithm for calculating safetycomplete test suites is specified. In Section 4, three case studies are presented that provide some insight into the situations where the new method leads to a significant test case reduction. These case studies are complemented by statistical evaluations based on state machines generated at random. In Section 5, references to related work are given. Section 6 presents the conclusion.
Since q = q-after-ε, where ε denotes the empty trace, it is practical to assume for the remainder of this article that ε ∈ V . Note that in principle, it is possible to specify state covers not containing ε, if there exist non-empty paths re-visiting the initial state. If M has reachable states only (in particular, if M is a prime machine), state covers with cardinality |Q| can always be found. For input traces x = x 1 . . . x k , the suffix starting at index i ∈ {1, . . . , k} is denoted by x i = x i . . . x k . The trace segment starting at i and ending at j , where i ≤ j and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, is denoted by x [i,j ] = x i . . . x j .
Test suites
A test suite is a subset TS ⊆ * I , each x ∈ TS is a test case. This simplified notation is possible, since only deterministic machines are considered, so that the input trace x uniquely determines the output trace to be expected according to the reference DFSM. An implementation passes a test case x if the application of this input sequence produces an output sequence y, such that x/y is in the language of the reference DFSM.
Fault models and complete test suites
In the context of this article, a fault model is a triple F = (M, ≤, D 
The H-method
The H-Method is a method for generating complete test suites, originally presented in Dorofeeva et al. (2005) . It can be applied to completely or incompletely specified, deterministic or nondeterministic finite state machines. To our best knowledge, the H-Method is the most effective complete testing method currently known, in the sense that it can guarantee completeness with respect to a given fault model with the lowest number of test cases required. Therefore, our safety-oriented test method presented in the next section will be based on the H-Method. In the context of our article, we only need the completely specified, deterministic variant: for safety-relevant control systems, deterministic behaviour is considered as mandatory. Moreover, robustness consideration require the system to react in a defined way for every input received in any internal state. This implies completely specified DFSMs. The H-Method is described in the sequel, to make this article sufficiently self-contained.
The following theorem has been proven in Dorofeeva et al. (2005, Theorem 1) . It is re-phrased here in the slightly specialised form for complete DFSMs.
Theorem 1 (H-Method) Let M be a completely specified, deterministic prime machine with n states. Let m ≥ n ≥ 2. Let V be a state cover of M, and let TS be a finite test suite of finite test cases. Define auxiliary sets
be a map satisfying
Then any test suite TS containing ∂H is complete with respect to fault model
In the definition of H in Theorem 1, the term V .
m−n+1 I
is only needed for the degenerate case n = 1, because then the sets D,
We do not present the original proofs of Theorem 1 established in Dorofeeva et al. (2005) , because it will turn out (see Corollary 1 below) that for the case where only completely specified DFSMs are considered, the H-method can be regarded as a special case of the more general Safety-complete H-method introduced and proven in Section 3 below. Let M = (Q, q, I , O , h) be a deterministic completely specified FSM. Then any reflexive and transitive relation ≤ s ⊆ O × O is called a safety-related output abstraction. The intuition behind this definition is that y ≤ s y indicates that an erroneous output of y instead of an expected output y does not induce a safety violation. Reflexivity just indicates that the occurrence of the output expected according to the reference model M can never be a safety violation. Transitivity implies that output z must also be a safe replacement of w, if
A Safety-complete H-Method
Safety-related output abstractions
Example 1 Consider a train onboard controller which compares actual train speed against the allowed speed and progressively outputs O = {ok, warning, ServiceBrakeTrigger, EmergencyBrakeTrigger}, depending on how much the train is overspeeding. The outputs ok and warning are shown on the display unit of the train engine driver, whereas the outputs ServiceBrakeTrigger and EmergencyBrakeTrigger directly act on the train's braking system. The service brake slows the train down with lower braking force than the emergency brake, so that the latter is used only as the "last resort", when warnings and service brake interventions do not suffice. These considerations induce a safety-related output abstraction ≤ s as the reflexive and transitive closure of
The intuition behind this definition is that a warning or even a braking intervention performed by the controller is an acceptable substitute for an expected ok-output from the safety perspective: the substitute output may be a nuisance (a spurious warning when the speed is within range) or even a severe reduction of reliability (triggering the emergency brake without need), but it does not introduce a safety threat. The same holds for situations where the service brake should be triggered but instead, the emergency brakes are activated.
When an intervention by service brakes or emergency brakes is expected, however, an output ok or warning would certainly be regarded as a safety hazard.
Next, suppose that the outputs to the train engine driver are extended by status messages O = {s 1 , . . . , s n }. Since these informative messages have no safety-relevance at all, we wish to extend the relation ≤ s in a way expressing that each status message can be replaced by any other output of O ∪ O without causing any safety hazard. This is achieved by extending ≤ s according to the rules
Finally consider a design extension, where the onboard controller operates in a decentralised distributed train control environment, so that it switches its own points
. . , m} along the route (such a system has been investigated, for example, in Haxthausen and Peleska (2000) ). Notation p + i stands for switching point number i into the straight position, p − i for switching the point into the branching position. From the safety-perspective, switching a point into the desired position cannot be replaced by any other event without introducing a safety hazard. Therefore, we extend ≤ s this time as follows:
The events of O and O , however, are incomparable: switching a point can never be a safe replacement for braking a train, and vice versa.
Given a safety-related output abstraction ≤ s on O , this is extended in the natural way to a reflexive and transitive relation (again denoted by
O , where #ι, #π is the length of ι, π, respectively. Now let q, q be two states of the same state machine or of different state machines over the same input/output alphabet ( I , O ). In the latter case, it is assumed without loss of generality that their states come from disjoint sets Q, Q . Then, it is possible to specify a joint output function ω : (Q ∪ Q ) × I → O which is extended in the natural way to operate on sequences of inputs, i.e. ω : 
If q ∼ s q holds, any input trace applied to q will lead to an output trace whichregarded from the safety perspective-is an admissible replacement of the outputs expected when applying the same inputs to q and vice versa. If the initial states q and q of two state machines M, M are s-equivalent (q ∼ s q), we denote this by M ∼ s M.
The following lemma states a simple, but important fact which links ∼ s to ∼. To state the lemma, we introduce the identity relation id(X) = {(x, x)|x ∈ X} which relates every element of some set to itself, but leaves distinct elements incomparable.
Lemma 1 If
Proof Since ≤ s is the diagonal relation by assumption, two output traces ι, π ∈ * O are only comparable if they coincide, that is,
As a consequence, q x ≤ s q if and only q x ∼ q, and therefore, ∼ s = ∼ follows. Q , q , I , O , h ) be completely specified, deterministic, and minimised FSMs over the same input/output alphabet Note that in the definition above, we do not require every safety-equivalent implementation to pass the safety-complete suite, because we are happy if the safety-driven suite also uncovers some non-critical failures violating I/O-equivalence. Furthermore, observe that the definition of safety-completeness coincides with ordinary completeness, if ≤ s is the identity relation on O : this follows directly from Lemma 1.
The safety-complete H-method
Theorem 2 (Safety-complete H-method) Using the notation above, let V ⊆ * I be a minimal state cover of M containing ε. Define auxiliary sets
be a map satisfying (q-after-α, q-after-β) .
Define a test case set H s by
H s = V . m−n+1 I ∪ {α. (α, β), β. (α, β)|(α, β) ∈ D s }.
Then any test suite TS containing ∂H s is safety-complete w.r.t. F s , that is,
Proof Assume that M passes the test suite, but is not safety-equivalent to M, that is, q ∂H s ∼ q but q ∼ s q. Since ε ∈ V by assumption and V ⊆ * I , we can conclude that * I = V . * I .
Therefore, any sequence z ∈ * I satisfying q V .x ∼ s q can be re-written as z = v.x with v ∈ V and x ∈ * I (note that v may be the empty trace ε). As a consequence, we can select 
As a consequence, the length of x must be greater than (m − n + 1). ∼ s q, a contradiction to the assumption about x being a shortest sequence of this kind.
Since M has at most m states, there are two input sequences α = β in V ∪ {ν.x [1,i] |i = 1, . . . , m − n + 1} with q -after-α = q -after-β. There are three cases to be distinguished about α, β:
Before analysing the 3 cases, we first observe that for the α, β occurring in cases 1, 2, or 3, the following fact holds.
( 1 ) This is shown by contradiction; suppose therefore, that q -after-α = q -after-β and
∼ s , and therefore also w.r.t ∼. Since q -after-α = q -after-β by assumption, M would produce the same outputs when applying (α, β) to these identical states, whereas M produces different outputs when applying (α, β) to q-after-α and q-after-β. This is a contradiction, because M is supposed to pass all tests in ∂H s .
With this information at hand, it can be concluded that case 1 above is not possible, because the input traces in V lead to n distinguishable states in M, so they must also lead to n distinguishable states in M according to implication (1). As a consequence, only case 2 or case 3 can apply. Hence, β = ν.x [1,j ] for some j = 1, . . . , m − n + 1, and ν.x = β.x j +1 . Since |x| > m − n + 1 the suffix x j +1 is non-empty. This leads to the derivation
, both x j +1 and x [1,i] .x j +1 are shorter than x, a contradiction to the assumption that x is a shortest input sequence with q V .x ∼ s q. Therefore, such an x cannot exist, and q must be ∼ s -equivalent to q. This concludes the proof.
Observe that in the proof of the theorem above, no reference to the completeness of the original H-method stated in Theorem 1 was needed. From the perspective of complete testing theories, it is interesting to note that Theorem 2 can be regarded as a generalisation of the H-Method, whose completeness has been stated above in Theorem 1. This fact is expressed by the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For completely specified DFSMs, the safety-complete H-method implies the completeness of the H-method.
Proof Let ≤ s = id( O ). Then Lemma 1 implies that ∼ s = ∼. For this case, the set D s specified in Theorem 2 coincides with D as specified in Theorem 1. As a consequence, also H s in Theorem 2 equals H as specified in Theorem 1. This establishes that Theorem 1 is the special case of Theorem 2, where ≤ s = id( O ).
It is noteworthy that
holds whenever M has at least two ∼ s -distinguishable states. This follows directly from the definition of the auxiliary sets B and D s in Theorem 2. Therefore, 
Implementation
For implementing an algorithm calculating the safety-complete test suite according to Theorem 2, we proceed as follows.
FSM abstraction Given a completely specified, deterministic, minimal FSM M = (Q, q, I , O , h), every safety-related output abstraction ≤ s ⊆ O × O induces an abstraction α s of the alphabet by mapping each output y ∈ O to the set of outputs y ∈ O that are greater or equal to y according to ≤ s .
is again finite, therefore it can be used as a new output alphabet of a state machine M s which is an abstraction of M with respect to ≤ s in the following sense.
Though M is assumed to be already minimised, the abstracted machine (Q, q, I 
Case studies and strategy evaluation
The models, evaluation algorithms, and experimental data discussed in this section are available on the website http://www.mbt-benchmarks.org.
Control of fasten seat belt and return-to-seat signs in the aircraft cabin
Application
The following example is a (slightly simplified) real-world example concerning safety-related and uncritical indications in an aircraft cabin. A cabin controller in a modern aircraft switches the fasten seat belt (FSB) signs located above the passenger seats in the cabin and the return to seat (RTS) signs located in the lavatories according to the rules modelled in the DFSM shown in Table 1 .
As inputs, the cabin controller reads the actual position of the fasten seat belts switch in the cockpit, which has the position f0 (OFF), f1 (ON), and f2 (AUTO). Further inputs come from the cabin pressure control system which indicates "cabin pressure low" by event d1 and "cabin pressure ok" by d0. This controller also indicates "excessive altitude" by e1 or "altitude in admissible range" by e0. Another sub-component of the cabin controller determines whether the so-called AUTO condition is true (event a1) or false (a0).
The cabin controller switches the fasten seat belt signs and return to seat signs on and off, depending on the actual input change and its current internal state. As long as the cabin pressure and the cruising altitude are ok (after initialisation of the cabin controller or if last events from the cabin pressure controller were d0, e0), the status of the FSB and RTS signs is determined by the cockpit switch and the AUTO condition: if the switch is in the ON position, both FSB and RTS signs are switched on (output 11 in Table 1 ). Turning the switch into the OFF position switches the signs off. If the switch is in the AUTO position, both FSB and RTS signs are switched on if the AUTO condition becomes true with event a1, and they are switched off again after event a0. The AUTO condition may depend on the status of landing gears, slats, flaps, and oil pressure, these details are abstracted to a1, a0 in our example. As soon as there occurs a loss of pressure in the cabin (event d1) or an excessive altitude is reached, the FSB signs must be switched on and remain in this state, regardless of the actual state of the cockpit switch and the AUTO condition. The RTS signs, however, need to be switched off, because passengers should not be encouraged to leave the lavatories in a low pressure or excessive altitude situation.
After the cabin pressure and the altitude are back in the admissible range, the FSB and RTS signs shall automatically resume their state as determined by the "normal" inputs from cockpit switch and AUTO condition.
Safety considerations Analysing the outputs
(FSB, RTS) ∈ O = {00, 10, 11, 01} from the safety-perspective leads to the identification of one safety-critical output (FSB, RTS) = (1, 0), which should be set whenever cabin decompression or excessive altitude occurs. If the other outputs {00, 11, 01} are changed due to an application error, this is certainly undesirable, but does not represent a safety hazard. Note that the output combination 01 should never occur at all.
These considerations lead to an abstraction function
11 → {00, 10, 11, 01} 01 → {00, 10, 11, 01} 10 → {10} as introduced in Section 3.3, and the abstracted FSM described there is obtained by replacing outputs 00, 01, 11 by YY = {00, 10, 11, 01}, while leaving every occurrence of output 10 unchanged.
Comparison H-method versus safety-complete H-method and Wp-methods The ref-
erence DFSM with 24 states as specified in Table 1 is already minimal. Applying our implementation of the H-Method results in a test suite with 511 test cases, for the case m = n = 24. The Safety-complete H-Method results in 337 test cases; this corresponds to an improvement of 34%. The main reason for this significant test case reduction is that the prime machine of the new DFSM resulting from the safety abstraction only has 4 states which corresponds to a state reduction of 83%, when compared to the original DFSM from Table 1 . This observation will be confirmed in the more general evaluation below.
In Huang and Peleska (2017a), we have described the results of applying a safetycomplete variant of the Wp-Method to the same example. There, the Wp-Method required 549 tests cases, and the safety-complete Wp-Method 468 cases. This example indicates that the H-Method and its safety-complete variant allow for significantly smaller test suites while guaranteeing the same completeness properties. This is confirmed by further examples below and by the detailed statistical evaluation presented in Section 4.4.
Synthetic example
Application The following example does not come from a practical application, but has been constructed to illustrate that the reduction of test cases in comparison to the original H-Method can be quite significant. The reference state machine is shown in Table 2 .
Safety considerations
We assume that outputs 1 and 2 can be considered as non-critical, so that they can be abstracted to a single output Y . Output 0 is considered as critical.
Comparison H-method versus safety-complete H-method and Wp-methods
The reference machine in Table 2 with its 7 states is already minimal, but the minimised abstracted DFSM only has 2 states, this corresponds to a state reduction of 71%. With assumption m = n, the H-Methods requires 61 test cases, while the Safety-complete H-Method only requires 31, this corresponds to a test case reduction of approx. 49%.
In Huang and Peleska (2017a) , the application of Wp and safety-complete Wp-Method (m = n) to the same example resulted in 87 test cases (Wp) which could be reduced to 41 (safety-complete Wp), so, as expected, the H-Methods perform significantly better.
While this example is of no practical value, it illustrates that test case reductions of approximately 50% are possible when using the Safety-complete H-Method instead of the original H-Method.
Garage door controller
Application This example has originally been proposed in Jorgensen (2017) . We use it here to confirm the fact discussed above, that the Safety-complete H-Method does not lead to test case reductions, if the prime machine of the abstracted DFSM has just as many states as the prime machine of the original reference model.
The garage door controller uses inputs from a remote control, two sensors indicating whether the door has reached the up position or the down position, respectively, and a light sensor indicating whether the door area is crossed while the door is closing or opening. The controller commands the motor to go down, up, stop, or to reverse the down direction to the up direction. Its detailed behaviour is specified in Table 3 . 
Safety considerations
The only output considered as safety-critical is the command to reverse the down-direction to the up direction. All other outputs can be abstracted to some value Y . Table 3 and its abstraction are not minimal. It turns out, however, that the minimised abstracted model still has as many states as the minimised reference model (4 states). As a consequence, both the H-Method and the Safety-complete H-Method requires 13 test cases for m = n. In Huang and Peleska (2017a) , the application of Wp and safety-complete Wp-Method resulted in 17 and 33 test cases, respectively. The safety-complete Wp-Method produced more test cases than the original Wp-Method. In contrast to that, the safety-complete HMethod algorithm guarantees to produce at most as many test cases as required by the H-Method.
Comparison H-method versus safety-complete H-method and Wp-methods Both the reference model in
Statistical experiments
In addition to the "hand-crafted" DFSMs discussed above, a comprehensive collection of experiments has been performed with DFSMs generated at random. For each DFSM, a safety-abstraction has been generated. Then the Wp-Method, the H-Method, the Safetycomplete Wp-Method, and the Safety-complete H-Method have been applied to generate test suites.
For each generation, the following parameters were recorded; these are also shown in the tables below.
|REF MIN | Number of states in the prime machine of the reference DFSM. |ABS MIN | Number of states in the prime machine of the DFSM safety abstraction. | I | Size of the input alphabet. m − n Hypothesis about the difference between maximal number m of states in the prime machine modelling the true implementation behaviour and number n of states in the prime machine of the reference model. |T S WP | Test suite size (i.e., number of test cases) of the suite generated using the WpMethod. |T S H | Test suite size of the suite generated using the H-Method. |T S SWP | Test suite size of the suite generated using the Safety-complete Wp-Method studied in Huang and Peleska (2017a) . |T S SH | Test suite size of the suite generated using the Safety-complete H-Method. Red H % Reduction of H-test suite versus Safety-H test suite size in percent, calculated using the formula
|T S SH | total , |T S H | total Total number of test steps occurring in the test suite generated using the H-Method and total number of test steps occurring in the test suite generated using the Safety-complete H-Method, respectively. These parameters are not explicitly shown in the tables presented here, but used to calculate the reduction percentage Red H total % described next. Red H total % Reduction of the number of test steps in percent, calculated using the formula
In Table 4 , the reduction of test suite size is recorded in dependency of the size |ABS MIN | of the safety abstraction's prime machine. An input alphabet of size 4 was used, together with the hypothesis m = n. All generated reference prime machines have approximately 100 states (see column |REF MIN |). Each line in this table is based on 100 experiments, therefore the values are given as the average over 100 generated reference machines. The reduction results are displayed for variations of |ABS MIN | from 2 to 30.
In Fig. 1 , a plot displaying the number of test cases generated by each method in dependency of |ABS MIN | is shown. The plot is based on the same data as presented in Table 4 . It can be seen that the Safety-complete Wp Method produces even more test cases than the H-Method, if |ABS MIN | ≥ 4. This presents clear evidence that the H-Method and its Safety-complete variant outperform the Wp-Method and the Safety-complete Wp-Method. Both table and plot also confirm an observation discussed in Huang and Peleska (2017a) : from a certain number of states in the abstraction's prime machine, the Safety-complete Wp-Method produces even more test cases than the Wp-Method. This contrasts to our implementation of the Safety-complete H-Method described in Section 3.3, where it is guaranteed that the latter never produces more test cases than the original H-Method. In theory, a new algorithm for the Safety-complete Wp-Method could be developed which also guarantees this property. Our experiments, however, have shown that such an algorithm would Table 4 Number of test cases generated by different methods and test case reduction compared to H-method in dependency of the size of the abstraction model's prime machine have a very high running time. In the light of the results shown in Table 4 and Fig. 1 , this is not worth the effort, since the Safety-complete H-Method is the preferred technique anyway.
In Table 5 , test suite reductions are recorded in dependency of |REF MIN |, while |ABS MIN | keeps the constant value 2. Together with the Table 4 discussed above, this confirms the intuitive understanding that an increasing difference |REF MIN | − |ABS MIN | increases the reduction percentage. The two tables also show that the absolute value of |ABS MIN | influences the amount of the reduction: Table 4 suggests that substantial reductions can be achieved if |ABS MIN | is less or equal to 10. Table 5 Number of test cases generated by different methods and test case reduction compared to H-method in dependency of the size of the reference model's prime machine The plots in Figs. 2 and 3 show that the test step reductions follow the same trend as the test case reductions. The former figure shows the reductions in dependency of the safety abstraction's size, the latter in dependency on the size of the reference model.
The increasing difference m − n has no significant impact on the test case reduction that can be obtained by using the Safety-complete H-Method instead of the normal one: Fig. 4 shows the reduction curve again in dependency of the size |ABS MIN |, but now for the value Fig. 4 Test case reduction and test step reduction in dependency of the size of the safety abstraction's prime machine, m − n = 3 m − n = 3. Comparing this with Fig. 2 shows the same trends for both cases m = n and m − n = 3.
Related work
Complete testing theories The investigation of complete theories for testing against finite state machine models has a long tradition. This started started with the W-Method published by Vasilevskii (1973) and Chow (1978) , who were the first to show that implementations whose true behaviour is represented by completely specified DFSMs with at most m states can be tested against reference models with n ≤ m states, such that any violation of I/Oequivalence will be uncovered by finitely many finite test cases derived from the reference model and the estimate m. Since then, these initial results have been extended to incompletely specified and nondeterministic finite state machines, and to reduction (language inclusion) as an alternative conformance relation to I/O-equivalence. Moreover, many of the new theories guaranteed complete fault coverage with considerably less test cases than needed according to the W-Method.
For the work presented here, the following results are of particular importance. The W-Method is outperformed by the Wp-Method published by Fujiwara et al. (1991) and extended by Luo et al. (1995) to nondeterministic incomplete FSMs. The key idea to the considerable test case reduction achieved in comparison with the original W-Method consisted in the fact that it is not always necessary to distinguish states reached during a test by means of all distinguishing traces contained in a characterisation set. Instead, so-called state identification sets-these are subsets of a characterisation set, distinguishing just one state from all the others-can be applied. In Petrenko et al. (1993) , the HSI-Method has been presented which yields further test case reductions in comparison to the Wp-Method. The H-Method used as the basis of this paper is a further significant step towards the reduction of test suite sizes, while still preserving completeness. A further, more recent, variant is the SPY method (Simão et al. 2012) which will is briefly discussed below in Section 6.
Property-oriented testing
The approach to focus test suites on safety-critical behavioural aspects is a special variant of property-oriented testing; see Machado et al. (2007) for an overview of this research field. As stated there, the main motivation for property-oriented testing is the possibility to reduce test suite size in comparison to a complete model-based conformance test suite: while the latter requires test cases to verify all possible behaviours in relation to a reference model, the former only requires to investigate the subset of possible behaviours which are relevant to verify a certain set or properties (i.e. requirements).
A typical approach to property-oriented testing is to state desired system requirements as formulas in a temporal logic (see e.g. Fernandez et al. (2003) and Li and Qi (2004) ) and construct test cases based on that formula. Since we are only interested in testable properties, the set of properties is usually restricted to safety properties. For linear safety properties (usually expressed as LTL formulas), the test oracle problem is solved by noting that the test executions violating the property (the so-called bad prefixes) are inside the language of a finite automaton, as described in Baier and Katoen (2008, Section 4.2) . This holds for the important class of regular safety properties. In the more general case, property violations can be characterised by accepting states of Büchi automata (Huang et al. 2014, Chapter 4) or Rabin automata (Safra 1988) . For test generation, the subsets of model executions are of interest, where the premises associated with the property under consideration are fulfilled, so that the expected SUT reactions can be observed. To our best knowledge, no general theory which guarantees complete fault coverage for the general class of safety properties has been elaborated yet: the publications (Fernandez et al. 2003 ) and Li and Qi (2004) , for example, only suggest heuristics for generating suitable test suites, without any guarantees concerning test strength or fault coverage.
The approach presented in this article differs fundamentally from the general approach described above: by specialising on safety properties that can be expressed by means of output abstractions, we can apply the conformance testing approach on a simpler model, instead of using a completely different property-oriented method. As a consequence, the concepts of fault coverage and completeness are very close to those used in general conformance testing, and the completeness proofs can be elaborated in a similar way. As a tradeoff, our safety properties are less general: there are linear safety requirements that cannot be expressed by safety-related output abstractions and their resulting DFSMs. From safetycritical systems testing in the railway and avionic domain, however, we know that the class of safety properties covered in this article fits the practical requirements quite often.
Conclusion
We have presented a testing strategy which guarantees to uncover every safety violation of a certain class when testing an implementation against a deterministic finite state machine reference model. The completeness guarantees hold under the assumption that the true behaviour of the implementation, when expressed by a minimised state machine, does not exceed a certain maximum number of states m, in comparison to the number n of states in the minimised reference model. Safety criticality has been modelled by means of a safety-related output abstraction which allows to express that certain outputs can be exchanged by certain others without introducing a safety threat. The new strategy has been derived from the H-Method which is known to guarantee complete fault coverage, while producing smaller test suites, when compared to the well-known older W-Method or WpMethod. A proof has been presented which shows that-while no longer guaranteeing to uncover every violation of input/output equivalence-the new strategy is safety-complete: it will uncover every failure which ends in an erroneous output representing a safety violation.
The experiments show that this Safety-complete H-Method may require significantly fewer test cases than the H-Method (reductions up to 50% have been observed). It has been indicated by other examples, however, that this reduction is not guaranteed: the most important factor influencing the decrease of test cases is the reduction of states achieved when transforming the original reference machine to its safety-related abstraction.
The key insight that arbitrary distinguishing traces can be used instead of (subsets of) the characterisation set, in order to check the correctness of target states reached in a test case execution has been perfected in the H-Method. In comparison to the "classic" W-Method and Wp-Method, this led to a significant reduction of test cases needed to guarantee full fault coverage. This motivated our decision to base the safety-complete testing method introduced here on the H-Method. Previous experiments (Huang and Peleska 2017a ) based on the W-Method and the Wp-Method, as well as the detailed statistical experiments described here (Section 4.4) confirm that (1) the H-Method outperforms the Wp-Method and WMethod, as stated in Dorofeeva et al. (2005) , and (2) that the safety-complete variants of these methods are also outperformed by the safety-complete H-Method described here. It is not surprising that the reductions of test suite sizes achieved with the H-Method carry over to the safety-complete variant: we have shown in Corollary 1 that the original H-Method can be considered as a special case of the more general safety-complete H-Method, at least if completely specified DFSMs are considered.
For future work, we plan to investigate a safety-complete variant of the SPY-Method (Simão et al. 2012) . The authors explain why this method should be the most effective complete FSM-based testing strategy currently available: it tries to distribute the exponential number of test fragments from the traversal sets on different test cases. However, they do not compare the SPY method to the H-Method, only the HSI-Method (Petrenko et al. 1993 ) is evaluated in the comparison.
Further ongoing work is concerned with the extension of the results presented here to more general safety properties. Ideally, the whole class of the so-called Safety-LTL Properties (Sistla 1994) should be covered by a safety-complete testing theory.
The concept described here can be extended to more complex systems whose behaviour is represented by Extended Finite State Machines or, equivalently, by a certain class of Kripke structures over infinite input domains, but with finite domains for internal states and outputs. It has been shown in Huang and Peleska (2017b) that a specific input equivalence class construction technique can be applied, so that any complete testing theory valid for FSMs can be translated to a likewise complete equivalence class partition testing strategy for these systems with Kripke semantics.
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